The debtor stated a cause of action for a violation of the discharge injunction when the debtor alleged that the creditor failed to timely update information that the creditor furnished to credit reporting agencies pre-pretition. The debtor is entitled to conduct further discovery on that cause of action before the court rules on the creditor's motion for summary judgment.

Debtor's student loans were discharged because she satisfied the three prongs of the Brunner test.

Summary judgment was appropriate where the Debtor was collaterally estopped from relitigating the State Court's factual findings that she intentionally interfered with her former husband's relationship with his daughter by falsely accusing him of child sexual abuse. Therefore, the debts arising from such willful and malicious conduct are excepted from discharge pursuant 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).

The Chapter 13 debtor's pre-discharge complaint to determine the dischargeability of a 2002 income tax laibility is dismissed pursuant to the IRS's motion for a judgment on the pleadings. The IRS conceeded that, should the debtor receive a discharge at the end of the debtor's proposed 60 month plan, the taxes would be discharged. Therefore, although all the facts necessary for making the dischargeability determination had already occurred, the issue was not ripe for review because no hardship existed to the debtor by withholding a court order on dischargeabiltiy until after the debtor obtained his discharge.

A debtor's cause of action under section 46A-2-128(e) of the Code of West Virginia, for impermissible contact with a debtor when the debtor is represented by an attorney, is not preempted by the Bankruptcy Code's remedies for a violation of the automatic stay or discharge injunction because section 46A-2-128(e) is an independent remedy based on a separate wrong from those addressed in the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's cause of action under section 46A-2-128(e), however, is not one that "arises under" or "arises in" the Bankruptcy Code, and is not one that is "realted to" the debtor's bankrutpcy case because win, lose, or draw, the outcome of the case will not have any effect on the bankruptcy estate. No bankruptcy court jursidiction exists to adjudicate the cause of action under the district court's supplemental jurisdiction granted by section 1367 of title 28 of the United States Code because that jurisdictional grant is not applicable to the bankrutpcy courts.

Creditor's section 523(a)(2)(B) adversary complaint to except a debt from discharge is granted based on the debtor's adoption of a loan application that falsely stated his gross monthly income. Trustee's preference action against the creditor for untimely perfecting an interest in the debtor's mobile home is granted, and the trustee's fraudulent conveyance action against the debtor's father, who was listed on the mobile home's certificate of title, is granted on the grounds that the father did not pay a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for that ownership interest.

The debtor was not a domicilarly of West Virginia for the full 730-day period preceding the date of the debtor's bankruptcy petition as required by section 522(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code; thus, the West Virginia exemption statutes were not applicable. Because the debtor was a domiciliary of the State of Georgia during the 180-day period preceeding the 730-day period before the filing of her petition, Georgia was the applicable State for determining what exemptions the debtor was entitled to claim. Although Georgia is an opt-out State, its opt-out statute did not include former domiciliaries such as the debtor. Since no prohibition existed under Georgia law to the debtor's use of the federal exemptions provided in section 522(d), the Chapter 7 trustee's objection to the debtor's claim of the federal homestead exemption was overruled. Additionally, the court did not find any Uniformity Clause violation in either Congress's enactment of section 522(b)(3), or in the court's conclusion that Georgia's opt-out statute would not apply to non-domicilaries like the debtor.

When the debtor's bankruptcy filing intervenes between the sale of his residence at a foreclosure auction and the recording of the foreclosure sale deed, the debtor's right to cure the mortgage arrearage under § 1322(c)(1) was extinguished upon the execution of the memorandum of sale.

The Debtor's motion to approve the disbursement of sale proceeds to a co-owner of real property pursuant to section 363(j) of the Bankruptcy Code is continued; objections to the Debtor's motion are converted by the court into motions for a preliminary injunction under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7065, and the parties are given the opportunity to prove that the co-owner's presently defined interest in the real property should be withheld by court order pending the adjudication of a future lawsuit against the co-owner to avoid her interest.